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INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

2 December 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE INTELLIGENCE ADVISORY COMMITTEE

SUBJECT: Memorandum re Soviet Reactions to the NATO
"Summit" Conference

The attached memorandum will be placed on the agenda of the
IAC meeting scheduled for 3 December, for discussion in connection
with the review of "sensitive situations."

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JOHN HEIRES
Secretary

Attachment

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DOCUMENT NO. 15
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NEXT REVIEW DATE: _____
AUTH: _____
DATE: 12 APR 1980 REVIEWER: 010045

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C E N T R A L I N T E L L I G E N C E A G E N C Y

21 November 1957

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

SUBJECT: Possible Soviet Reactions to the NATO "Summit"
Conference*

GENERAL SOVIET ATTITUDE

1. Recognizing that the December NATO meeting is an extraordinary attempt to overcome the crisis within NATO, the USSR will almost certainly seek in some manner to offset the impact of the NATO meeting. The USSR has already shown great concern over prospective US allocation of nuclear weapons and missiles to NATO allies.

2. Soviet propaganda will picture the session as further evidence of the aggressive designs of the NATO powers, in contrast to Soviet desires for peaceful coexistence. The USSR will probably seek to buttress this line and take the edge off the NATO session by one or more ostensibly constructive proposals for an East-West summit meeting, or on disarmament, etc. At the

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same time, the Kremlin will see no inconsistency in bluntly warning that the USSR's technological progress makes NATO useless, and that the USSR will react strongly to any nuclear strengthening of NATO.

3. But the Kremlin's apparent confidence in its own current "position of strength" is such that we do not see it as likely to offer any "concessions" in such fields as disarmament or German reunification. On the other hand, we doubt that the USSR will seek to counter the NATO meeting by such blatant pressure tactics as extensive harassment of Berlin or new threats in the Middle East, lest these prove counterproductive.

POSSIBLE SPECIFIC SOVIET ACTIONS

4. Within the above general framework, we suggest the following specific moves which the USSR might make before, during or after the NATO session. It should be noted that many of these moves might be taken irrespective of the NATO meeting.

a. Khrushchev may well try to steal the thunder from the NATO session by following up on his 6 November call for a new East-West Summit Conference, perhaps with more than the Big Four present. There are any number of topics to which the USSR could key such a call, including disarmament, Germany, the Middle East, a European security treaty and

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arms limitation zone, etc. Such a move would be most effective if made just before the NATO sessions. Alternatively the USSR could revive any of its proposals on these subjects in notes to the NATO powers.

b. In order to contrast its peaceful intentions with those of the West, the USSR might announce further unilateral force reductions, most likely in conventional forces.

c. On the other hand, Moscow may revive its harsh threats of last January-April against any NATO and other US allies permitting stationing of nuclear weapons and missiles on their soil. It will be especially sensitive to any provision of nuclear weapons to the Germans.

d. The USSR may also announce or actually undertake the stationing of its own nuclear weapons in Eastern Europe, as a countermove (this was threatened by Moscow radio on 13 November). Conceivably it would call a Warsaw Pact meeting for this purpose.

e. Further intimidatory revelations of Soviet advanced weapons capabilities, such as new satellite launchings or missile tests, may occur.

f. Moscow, or more likely, the Western European Communist parties, might seek to encourage the European Socialist parties

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to join them in opposing stationing of US nuclear weapons in Europe. The SPD's recent blast will have been duly noted.

g. The USSR will of course be alert to exploit any divisions among the NATO powers, as over the current Tunisian issue; at the least it will take propaganda advantage of them. We also would not discount the possibility of clandestine Soviet action to stir up trouble, e.g., by promoting an outbreak of terrorism in Cyprus or planting some US rifles with the Algerian rebels.


5. We think that the following possible moves are unlikely.

a. In view of its rigid position on German reunification, we doubt that the USSR would make any new offers on this subject, despite their obvious appeal in West Germany.

b. We doubt that the USSR would see much value in announcing formation of a new Communist roof organization as a countermove.

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FOR THE BOARD OF NATIONAL ESTIMATES


H. R. DULL
Acting Chairman

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